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Abstract
We analyze the determinants of a firm’s ownership structure when decisions over risk are
taken by majority vote of risk averse shareholders. We show that when a fraction of small,
diversified shareholders abstains from voting, mid-sized blockholders may emerge to mitigate
the conflict of interests between one large shareholder, who prefers less risky investments, and
these small, non-voting shareholders. The paper offers a novel explanation for the puzzling
observation that many firms have multiple blockholders. The paper develops numerous empirical
implications, for example on the link between ownership structure and risk choices and on the
relative size of blocks.
JEL: G32, G34, G11.
Keywords: Corporate governance, ownership structure, risk, contracts, majority voting, one share one vote, block-
holders.
The corporate governance literature has widely recognized the role of a large shareholder in
mitigating free-rider problems regarding monitoring or other value enhancing actions that arise
when there is dispersed ownership.1 There is, however, a vast empirical literature which shows
that ownership structure often takes more complex forms, ranging from one large shareholder to
multiple intermediate-sized shareholders to fully dispersed structures.2 The few theoretical studies
which attempt to explain this heterogeneity in ownership structure focus on the role of mid-sized
blockholders in disciplining managers or in sharing control benefits (see Winton (1993), Zwiebel
(1995), Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) and Edmans and Manso (2011), discussed in more detail
below).
This paper offers a novel rationale for the existence of multiple mid-sized blockholders: they
endogenously arise to mitigate the conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder on the one
hand and dispersed shareholders on the other. More precisely, suppose there is an initial owner of a
firm who wants to issue shares to raise capital for an investment project. The initial owner cannot
commit to taking a value enhancing action in the future, e.g. monitoring the manager, unless he
holds a sufficiently large stake (e.g. Maug (1998)).3 Outside investors demand shares conditional
on the offer price set by the initial owner. Both the owner and other investors are risk averse.
Once the ownership structure is established, shareholders vote on the riskiness of the project that
the firm subsequently undertakes. The investment technology is such that higher returns can only
be achieved by increasing risk. Investors’ preferences over the available risk/return profiles depend
endogenously on their chosen shareholding. The higher the ownership stake, the lower the preferred
1Grossman and Hart (1980), Stiglitz (1985), Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holmström and Tirole (1993), Admati
et al. (1994), Burkart et al. (1997), Pagano and Röell (1998), Bolton and von Thadden (1998) Maug (1998), Kahn
and Winton (1998) among others look at the active role of monitoring by the shareholder while Admati and Pfleiderer
(2009) and Edmans (2009) focus on the shareholder’s threat to exit from the firm as a governance tool.
2In the US (where it is widely agreed that regulation helps dispersed ownership), 67% of public firms have more
than one shareholder with a stake larger than 5%, while only 13% are widely held and 20% have only one blockholder
(Elaborations from the database of Dlugosz et al. (2006)). In Europe (where concentrated ownership is the norm), in
eight out of the nine largest stock markets of the European Union the median size of the second largest voting block
in large publicly listed companies exceeds five percent (data from the European Corporate Governance Network).
La Porta et al. (1999) find that 25% of the firms in various countries have at least two blockholders while Laeven and
Levine (2008) find that 34% (12%) of listed Western European firms have more than one (two) large owners where
large owners are considered shareholders with more than a 10% stake.
3The moral hazard problem allows us to endogenize the existence of a first large shareholder. The model is,
however, robust to alternative reasons why we have a large shareholder, e.g. signalling his faith in the firm to outside
investors.
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risk exposure, creating an endogenous conflict of interest between the initial owner, who must hold
a large block, and dispersed shareholders.
We assume, realistically, that only a fraction of the small shareholders are active in that they
actually vote. This assumption can be justified by a cost of voting and the free-rider problem that
arises when an individual’s vote is not pivotal.4 The (partial) abstention from voting by small
shareholders potentially drives a wedge between a shareholder’s cash flow rights and the power in
decision taking. For example, if the initial owner is the only blockholder, he might have a minority
of cash flow rights, but a majority of votes cast. Dispersed shareholders thus might anticipate that
the future investment decision will not be in their favour, which reduces their willingness to pay
for the shares. Since the total fraction of shares they hold may be large, this reduction in share
price hurts the initial owner. The latter may then benefit from the emergence of another smaller
blockholder who would be pivotal and indirectly serve as a commitment device for the initial owner
to shift the choice of risk towards an outcome that is more favourable to dispersed shareholders.
Paradoxically, of course, as an additional shareholder acquires a larger stake, his preferences move
closer to those of the initial owner, who holds a large stake. The additional blockholder thus allows
the initial owner to sell shares at a higher price, without going as far as allowing small shareholders
to implement their preferred choice of risk. Note however that because the benefit of choosing the
project is outweighed by the cost of being poorly diversified, the mid-sized blockholder, in spite
of being pivotal, benefits less from his shareholding than dispersed shareholders. In this sense he
provides a public good to dispersed shareholders.
In addition to the above ownership structure, we show that other ownership structures may
emerge, depending on the severity of the moral hazard problem in monitoring faced by the initial
owner. If the moral hazard problem is severe, the initial owner must retain a large stake, increasing
the subsequent conflict of interest with dispersed shareholders. In this case, the equilibrium own-
ership structure will feature one large shareholder (the initial owner) who is pivotal in voting and
a fringe of dispersed shareholders, who pay a low price for their shares. Conversely, when conflicts
4For a micro foundation of shareholder abstention from voting, see van Wesep (2014). In the US vote turnout of
shareholders is between 70% and 80% (Bethel and Gillan (2002), Ferri and Sandino (2009) and Hamdani and Yafeh
(2013)). Practitioners are aware of the importance of passive investors. GMI Ratings for CalPERS (2013) documents
the importance of absenteeism and regulation on how to deal with the broker non-votes.
4
of interest are small (the moral hazard problem is mild), a dispersed ownership structure may arise
in which the initial owner is the only blockholder, but he has a small stake and so will be outvoted
by dispersed shareholders, who thus will be willing to pay a high price for their shares.
Our model has implications for how decisions on risk are affected by ownership structure: in
particular, decisions are effectively determined by the shareholder who is pivotal - and that may
not be the largest shareholder, but could be a mid-sized blockholder. The idea that mid-sized
blockholders are activists in firm decisions is supported empirically (Helwege et al. (2012) and
Yermack (2010)) and by survey evidence (McCahery et al. (2010)), but has so far been difficult to
explain from a theoretical perspective.
In our model multiple large shareholders are associated with higher risk. These predictions are
consistent with the findings of several papers in the empirical literature, which show that firms with
less concentrated ownership invest in higher risk projects, such as R&D and skill intensive activities
(Carlin and Mayer (2000; 2003), Faccio et al. (2001), John et al. (2008), Laeven and Levine (2009),
Wright et al. (1996)).
Our model also predicts that multiple large shareholders choosing higher risk, should be posi-
tively related to higher firm value while a single large shareholder is associated with lower firm value.
Consistent with our theory, several papers find that firms with multiple blockholders have higher
market value (Lehmann and Weigand (2000), Volpin (2002) and Maury and Pajuste (2005)).5
Furthermore the model highlights how ownership structure affects underpricing in IPOs. In an
equilibrium where blockholders are present, share prices are below the reservation price of a well
diversified shareholder. Hence, according to our theory, IPO underpricing arises when mid-sized
blocks are present and does not occur with other ownership structures. This is consistent with some
empirical studies that find a relationship between underpricing and ownership structure (Brennan
and Franks (1997), Chitru et al. (2004) and Goergen and Renneboog (2002)).6
The model identifies a set factors which affect ownership structure and through it a firm’s risk
5Konijn et al. (2011), however, find the opposite relation empirically.
6Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) show that IPO underpricing can serve to
ensure the participation of large investors who can monitor and hence be value enhancing. In these papers, control
considerations are absent and the role of multiple large investors is not analyzed. Empirically these models imply
that there is no difference between one or multiple blockholders.
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profile. One is the degree of moral hazard linked to the value enhancing action taken by the largest
blockholder. Even though the value enhancing action does not affect risk directly, it affects the
size of the largest block and hence firm’s risk preferences. In particular our theory predicts that for
medium sizes of the largest blockholder at least another blockholder should emerge. Moreover, the
size of the second largest block increases in the size of the largest block (so as to counterbalance
its voting power). Moreover, the size of each block decreases in the number of blockholders. These
predictions are confirmed empirically by Carlin and Mayer (2000).
Another factor which affects ownership structure is regulation determining voting rules and the
possiility of proxy voting. In the US for example broker non-votes and absenteeisms are treated
differently across states: In California shares that are not voted are counted as voting with man-
agement, while they are counted as abstentions in Delaware (GMI Ratings for CalPERS (2013)).
Our model predicts that, ceteris paribus, economic systems which thwart voting by minority share-
holders should have firms with more concentrated ownership. This happens because a large initial
owner can retain an outright majority of votes cast with a smaller fraction of shares owned - obvi-
ating the need to introduce a second blockholder. Conversely, ownership structures where effective
control is with dispersed shareholders are harder to sustain, as they require a larger fraction of
total share ownership to be in the hands of small, dispersed shareholders. We are not aware of
empirical work that directly tests for such a relationship. There is, however, indirect evidence from
the comparison of ownership structures in the UK and the US. Becht et al. (2009) find higher risk
taking and higher value creation in the UK, and link it to UK pension fund activism. The UK legal
system favours smaller but significant ownership stakes that can be thought of as mid-sized blocks.
The inherent degree of riskiness of a firm also affects its ownership structure. Firms operating
in very risky sectors can potentially suffer large conflicts of interest between the largest blockholder
and small shareholders. Our model predicts multiple blockholder ownership structures in such
firms, while firms operating in more mature sectors should tend to have only one large shareholder
with a fringe of small shareholders.
Growth opportunities have similar implications for ownerships. Firms with significant growth
opportunities should exhibit larger conflicts of interest among shareholders. Hence, we expect such
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firms to have less dispersed ownership structure.
The theoretical and empirical literature on the role of blockholders in corporate governance is
extensively discussed in Edmans (forthcoming). We therefore focus our discussion of the literature
only on the most closely related papers. In the existing literature, the main rationale for the
existence of blockholders is to discipline a manager, either through monitoring and/or through
the threat of ‘exit’ (Kahn and Winton (1998), Edmans (2009) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2009)).
When multiple blockholders are present, the monitoring effort of the single blockholder is reduced
because of free rider problems (Winton (1993) and Noe (2002)). Hence, the exit route becomes a
more efficient tool to discipline the manager (Edmans and Manso (2011)).
Alternatively blockholders arise to overcome wealth constraints at the cost of sharing private
benefits (Zwiebel (1995)) or diverting cash (Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). In Zwiebel (1995),
multiple blockholders may arise from the following trade-off. On the one hand, investors are wealth
constrained, so several of them are needed to finance the firm. On the other hand, shareholders
in control have to share a fixed amount of private benefits. The sharing rule of private benefits is
such that large blockholders lose out when additional (mid-sized) blockholders emerge. Similarly,
Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) study a wealth-constrained initial owner who needs to issue
shares to finance a project. The winning coalition of shareholders can divert cash from minority
shareholders. Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) show that multiple blockholders may arise so as
to internalize more of the negative cash flow effects implied by subsequent expropriation by the
winning coalition.
We provide a new rationale for the existence of medium-sized blockholders. Risk aversion
determines the rise of blockholders even when no wealth constraints are present: the initial owner
could choose to borrow funds and retain an undiluted equity stake, but he chooses not to do so
because of risk aversion. Unlike Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), in our model
blockholders share the cost of being undiversified and may actually be better off when one or more
additional blockholders emerge.
Moreover, in Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000) ownership structure affects
the division of private benefits or cash diversion, both of which are difficult fo observe empirically.
7
In contrast to that, in our model ownership structure is linked to risk choices of the firm, which in
principle can be measured. Specifically, in our model, but unlike Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon (2000), blockholders play an active role in determining a firm’s risk exposure. Therefore,
we predict that more concentrated ownership structures are associated with more conservative
investment choices.
Our paper is also related to some of the literature on inside equity ownership, where an insider’s
risk aversion plays a crucial role (see Lambert et al. (1991), Sung (1995), Ou-Yang (2003) and
Edmans and Gabaix (2011) for theoretical treatments and Prendergast (2002) for a review of the
empirical contributions). This literature focuses on the role and extent of internal/managerial
ownership, while our model is mainly concerned with the composition of external ownership.
Finally, the paper contributes to the literature on voting. Typically, in models on voting, indi-
vidual preferences are fixed and independent of the voting power of an agent (see Dhillon (2005)
for a review). By applying voting theories to corporate governance, we show that voters as share-
holders have risk preferences that depend endogenously on their voting power. Moreover, voting
power is itself endogenized through the ability to purchase shares at an endogenously determined
price. One contribution our paper makes in this context is to point out the important role that
vote abstention by small shareholders has on the overall ownership structure of a firm.
1. The Model
There is an entrepreneur (the initial owner) who has an investment opportunity requiring capital,
K. The initial owner can finance the project by issuing equity or by personal borrowing. There is
a large number, N , of potential investors.





where j ∈ {i, E}, E refers to the initial owner, i refers to a potential investor, γ is the parameter
of risk aversion and Yj is final wealth. Each agent j, is initially endowed with 1 unit of wealth. As
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agents have CARA preferences, this assumption is w.l.o.g.
An agent j can invest his wealth either in the firm or in the risk free asset. We define respectively
wj and 1− wj the fraction of wealth invested in the firm and the risk free asset. Since each agent
is endowed with one unit of wealth, wj also denotes the amount of wealth invested in the firm.
The gross return of the risk free asset is normalized to 1. The return and the risk of the firm is
determined during the game. No assumptions on wj are made, so borrowing and short selling are
possible.
There are 5 periods: 0, ..., 4. At date 0 the initial owner chooses to invest wE in the firm and
to retain a fraction αE of shares. The remaining fraction, 1−αE , is tendered through a take-it-or-
leave-it offer to outside investors in exchange for the remaining capital, K − wE . We assume that
the initial owner, if he raises any capital at all, raises exactly the amount of capital required to
undertake the project.7 Thus, 1−αEK−wE represents the fraction of shares per unit of capital invested
by outside investors; or alternatively K−wE1−αE is the capital invested per fraction of shares, that is,
the issue price. The initial owner acts as a monopolist in setting this price, implicitly determined
at date 0 by the initial owner’s choice of wE and αE . Note that although all outside investors pay
the same price, K−wE1−αE , this price is not necessarily the same as the price implicitly paid by the
initial owner, wEαE .
At date 1 shares are issued and a potential outside investor, i, maximizes his utility by choice
of wi, which corresponds to demand for shares αi,D =
1−αE
K−wEwi. We assume that if there is under-
subscription the project cannot go ahead. If there is over-subscription, shares are distributed
according to the following rationing rule: shares are distributed to investors according to the size
of the demand (larger ones first), and, whenever there is a tie, investors are chosen randomly and
if chosen receive the full quantity demanded. Hence, when attributed, investor i receives a fraction
αi = αi,D of shares. The ownership structure, once established, is observed by all.
At date 2, shareholders decide on the risk/return profile of the firm’s business activities, captured
by an investment opportunity with value, Ṽ , which is uncertain and given by Ṽ = (R+ ε̃)X +µK
with ε̃ ∼ N(0, σ2) and parameters R > 0, σ > 0. X ∈ [0, X̄] captures a choice of risk/return profile,
7If the firm has to invest the surplus in the risk free asset, it can be shown that the initial owner never wishes to
raise more than K − wE from outside investors.
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determined by a shareholder vote and µK is the extra expected cash flow from a value enhancing
action (described in more detail below). Hence, Ṽ ∼ N(R̄X + µK,X2σ2).8
X can be thought of as a decision on the type of project a firm will invest in, or the nomination
of a CEO who comes with a certain risk profile. Ex-ante, i.e. when shares are issued, X is a non
contractible action, maybe because it is impossible to describe at that point all possible business
opportunities that may later emerge. It becomes contractible ex-post (at date 2) when the set of all
possible future investments becomes known (as in Grossman and Hart (1980)).9 At that point X is
determined by the Condorcet voting mechanism: the Condorcet winner, if it exists, is the project
that wins against every other project in pair-wise majority voting. We assume one-share-one-vote
and, in case of tie-break, the outside investors, and among them those with the largest fraction of
shares, win.
In order to capture different participation in the vote, we assume that a fraction λ of outside
investors are ex-ante ‘active’. An active investor, if he becomes a shareholder, will vote. The
remaining fraction of outside investors are ‘passive’, that is they never vote. Moreover, outside
investors take into account their anticipated voting behaviour (active or passive) when choosing
their demand for shares. We define liquidity shareholders as those outside investors who hold
an optimally ‘diversified’ portfolio (given their beliefs on the investment characteristics). This is
in contrast with ‘blockholders’ who we define as shareholders that are not fully diversified. We
assume that ex-post a fraction λ of liquidity shareholders is active in any ownership structure. This
assumption can be justified by the observation that the utility of an individual liquidity shareholder
does not change regardless of whether he casts his vote or not. Hence, active and passive investors
are willing to pay the same price to become liquidity shareholders. We show later that only active
investors choose to become blockholders. Hence, blockholders always vote. Strictly speaking, the
fraction of active investors in the remaining population therefore changes. Since N is large, we
approximate this fraction by λ.10
8Scaling RX by the size of the investment K does not change the qualitative results of the model.
9In order for voting to play some role, there must be something to vote on, i.e., something not already contracted
upon (see Hart (1995, p. 92-93)).
10Alternatively, we could assume that there is an infinite number of outside investors and that there is a lower
bound on the size of a claim that can be held (e.g., nobody can hold a claim worth less then one cent). This ensures
that there is a well defined maximum dispersion of ownership (see Proof of Propositions 2-4).
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The rationale for assuming λ < 1 is that some investors may have a prohibitive cost of obtaining
and understanding the firm’s investment proposals, or actually exercising their vote.11 A higher λ
corresponds to a decrease in the cost of vote participation, due for example to the introduction of
new disclosure rules which lower the cost of understanding investment proposals, or the possibility of
voting by proxy. The parameter λ captures the effect of regulation on a firm’s ownership structure.
In period 3 the initial owner decides whether to take a non-contractible costly value enhancing
action, denoted by µ ∈ {0, 1}.12 When management and control are separate, µ = 1 can be
interpreted, for example, as the decision to monitor the manager. Otherwise, µ could simply refer
to the choice of a costly effort level. In the rest of the paper we will refer to µ = 1 as monitoring,
though, as we said, it can be interpreted much more broadly. We assume that the action increases
the project value proportionally to the required investment, i.e. by µK, at a cost of mµK.
Note that the assumption that the monitoring decision occurs after the voting decision is w.l.o.g.
Finally at period 4 pay-offs are realized. Figure 1 shows the time-line of the game.
— INSERT DhillonFig1.pdf HERE —-
Taking into consideration that αi,D =
1−αE
K−wEwi, we formulate the maximization problem of the
initial owner and outside investors in terms of certainty equivalent. Investor i’s objective function
is:






σ2X2α2i,D + 1 (2)
The first part of expression (2) is the expected wealth from investing in the firm, the second part
11Alternatively, they might not think strategically and believe that their vote cannot affect the overall outcome.
As will become clear later, this belief is actually self-fulfilling in equilibrium in that passive investors end up choosing
stakes that are too small to make them pivotal.
12Assuming that only the initial owner can take this action does not affect the results: Proposition 6 shows that if
the initial owner does not have the incentive to take the action, no other investor does.
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is the cost of acquiring the stake and the third part is the dis-utility from risk exposure.
Similarly, the initial owner’s objective function is:
UE = αE(RX + µK)− wE −
γ
2
σ2X2α2E + 1−mµK (3)
Our notion of equilibrium is subgame perfect equilibrium (see Appendix A.1.1 for a more de-
tailed definition). Therefore, each player’s choice at a given date is made, given the history of
play up to that date, and given expectations about future actions. These expectations have to be
correct in equilibrium. At date 0, the initial owner chooses αE , wE so as to maximize (3). Then,
at date 1, all outside investors simultaneously choose αi,D maximizing (2). At date 2 all active
shareholders vote, maximizing their respective objective functions, (3) for the initial owner and
(2) for the outside investors. Finally, at date 3, the initial owner chooses whether or not to moni-
tor. Moreover, the optimization is subject to the following constraints: i) Feasibility: The initial
owner is able to raise the minimum capital needed, i.e. K −wE =
∑
iwi and ii) Full Subscription:
αE +
∑
i αi,D ≥ 1. The rationing rule ensures that αE +
∑
i αi = 1. αE = 0, wE = 0 corresponds
to the case where the initial owner does not raise capital and invests all his wealth in the risk free
asset, i.e. UE = 1. It is obvious that the initial owner will raise capital if he gets a utility of at
least 1.
Note that in many putative equilibria more than one investor needs to buy shares. In such
cases there is also trivially a no-trade equilibrium where no investor buys any shares anticipating
that no other investor will buy shares and the project will then not go ahead.
2. Monitoring Incentives, Voting and Outside Equity Ownership
2.1 Monitoring Incentives and Voting Game
We solve the game by backward induction. We first derive the initial owner’s monitoring choice,
given that at date 3 the ownership structure α = (αE , α1, ..., αN ) and the voting outcome, denoted
by Xmed, are already known. For ease of exposition, we order the outside investors by decreasing
stake, so that α1 denotes the largest outside shareholder.
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Lemma 1. The initial owner chooses µ = 1 iff αE ≥ m.
The initial owner monitors if and only if his stake in the firm in sufficiently large, αE ≥ m.
Once αE is observed, outside investors can infer the equilibrium monitoring decision.
The second last stage is the voting game. We now derive agent j’s ideal project, Xj , i.e., that
X which maximizes Uj , given the agent’s shareholding, αj . Note that because of its additive effect,
the monitoring decision does not affect the optimal X.








The desired risk exposure Xj decreases in the shareholder’s stake αj . This follows from the fact
that the objective function is quadratic in X. Moreover, for any given αj shareholder preferences on
X are single peaked. Hence, by the median voter theorem (Black (1948)), there exists a Condorcet
winner on the set [0, X̄] and it coincides with the preferred project of the median voter. The vote
outcome, Xmed, is thus the ideal project of that shareholder whose ideal project is such that 50%
of the voting shareholders would have (weakly) preferred a smaller X and 50% a (weakly) higher
X.13 Denote by ᾱ ≡ R
γσ2X̄
the fraction of shares below which a shareholder’s ideal project is the
high risk corner X̄, i.e. for αj ≤ ᾱ, Xj(αj) = X̄.
Note that because the monitoring decision does not depend on the firm’s risk choices and vice
versa, the timing of the two decisions can be reversed.
2.2 Ownership Subgame
In the ownership subgame, outside investors buy shares having observed (αE , wE), anticipating the
voting outcome, given their beliefs about the equilibrium ownership structure (i.e. other investors’
demands), and anticipating the initial owner’s monitoring decision. In addition, active investors
take into account that their own stake may affect the voting outcome.
13Consider the frequency distribution of shares of initial owner and active investors only on the set X. The median
X is the unique Xj such that exactly half the shares are on either side of it.
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Formally, an Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS) is a Nash equilibrium of the subgame
corresponding to a particular combination (αE , wE). In particular:
Definition 3. An Equilibrium Ownership Structure (EOS) is a vector α such that for a given (αE ,
wE), the following conditions are satisfied:
a) Investors maximize their expected utility by choice of αi,D, given (wE , αE) and their beliefs
on other agents’ stake, αi and the monitoring choice, µ. If they are passive they act given their
beliefs on Xmed, while if they are active they choose αi,D strategically, taking into account the
impact of their vote on Xmed;
b) Beliefs must be correct in equilibrium;




i αi = 1− αE ;
d) µ ∈ arg maxUE given (wE , αE , Xmed).
We define 4 types of EOS depending on who is pivotal. When there is a conflict of interest,
the identity of the pivotal shareholder matters, and we distinguish between three cases (i) the n-
Blockholders EOS, where n outside blockholders are pivotal; (for simplicity, we focus on the case
where all blockholders hold the same fraction of shares, αn, although it is easy to extend the results
to asymmetric cases); (ii) the Initial Owner EOS; or (iii) the Liquidity Shareholders EOS. There
may, however, be no conflict of interest in equilibrium, in which case the issue of who is pivotal
does not arise. This is the fourth case we consider.
The next step is to find the EOS for each pair (αE , wE). The analysis is quite technical and is
largely relegated to Appendix A.2.3. Below, we discuss some preliminary results that help develop
intuition for the main mechanisms at work. We start by analyzing the optimal fraction of shares
held by liquidity shareholders and blockholders.
Consider first the liquidity shareholders’ shares. We denote αl,med, the shares demanded and
attributed to liquidity shareholders when the anticipated voting outcome isXmed. A straightforward
maximization of the utility function (2) with respect to αi yields:
αl,med =





In the particular case where Xmed = X̄, we denote the optimal fraction of shares (the solution of
the maximization above) by ᾱl.
A useful benchmark is to consider outside shareholders’ preferred choice of X and α, if they
had the power to determine X.
Lemma 4. If K−wE1−αE > µK, outside investors preferred choice is Xmed = X̄ and αi = ᾱl.
An outside shareholder can reduce exposure to risk by diversifying optimally (reducing his αi).
If she could choose unilaterally X, her ideal project would be X̄, the maximum risk/return project.
The optimal demand corresponding to X̄ is ᾱl by definition.
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It follows immediately from Lemma 4 that in a Liquidity Shareholder EOS (i.e., when the
liquidity shareholders are pivotal) the equilibrium choice of risk is X̄.
Consider next the demand for shares by blockholders, if they arise.
Lemma 5. If K−wE1−αE > µK, blockholders arise only if they are pivotal. In an n-Blockholder EOS
they would therefore hold
αn =
αE − λ(1− αE)
(1− λ)n
(6)
where αE > αn > αl,n.
The purpose of becoming a blockholder (and holding a suboptimal portfolio) is to move the
decision away from XE towards X̄. If blockholders arise at all, they must therefore be pivotal and
hence, only active investors choose to become blockholders.
It is also clear from (6) that blockholders cannot arise when λ = 1. In such a situation we can
have two cases. The initial owner has an outright majority and is in control, so acquiring a block
will not change that. Alternatively the liquidity shareholders have an outright majority and are in
control, in which case outside shareholders already achieve the best they can hope for and there is
no need for a blockholder. When λ < 1 and no blockholders arise, there are (1− λ)(1−αE) shares
that are not voted. An active shareholder can potentially change the voting outcome by purchasing
a block of these shares and using them to tip the voting balance.





An individual blockholder’s stake is the minimum required to become pivotal, given by (6). A
blockholder always wants to hold fewer shares than the initial owner. This is because in order to
become pivotal it is sufficient for the blockholder to position herself between the initial owner and
the liquidity shareholders. No blockholder wants to own more, as that would expose her to higher
risk without changing anything in terms of control. If she holds any less, she ceases to be pivotal
and would then prefer to be a liquidity shareholder. Note that this differs from Bennedsen and
Wolfenzon (2000) where outside investors prefer to be part of the winning coalition and multiple
blockholders of equal size arise.
A blockholder will then choose an X between the preferred choice of the liquidity shareholders
and of the initial owner (Lemma 4). This is the sense in which blockholders mitigate the conflicts
of interest between the initial owner and the liquidity shareholders.
As the blockholders arise to counterbalance the initial owner’s voting power, the larger the
initial owner’s stake, the larger the blockholders’ ( ∂αn∂αE > 0). These predictions are consistent
with Carlin and Mayer (2000) who report a positive relationship between the size of the largest
blockholder and the second and third blockholders.
Note also that what determines whether blockholders gain control is their joint stake nαn.
Therefore, when there are more blockholders each one can be smaller as long as they add up to a
stake that can counterbalance the initial owner (∂αn∂n < 0). In line with these results, Carlin and
Mayer (2000) find that when a third blockholder is present, the size of the second is significantly
smaller than the first, but similar to the third blockholder. This differs from Zwiebel (1995): there
blockholders arise because of the initial owner’s wealth constraints and hence the larger the initial
owner’s stake the smaller is the external blockholders’.
Before moving on to a full description of equilibria we introduce some additional notation.
In order to get full subscription, the initial owner must satisfy outside investors’ participation
constraints by setting a low enough price, K−wE1−αE . This corresponds to a lower bound on wE as a
function of αE . This lower bound will differ depending on the ownership structure and is denoted
wE,ι with ι = {E,n, L} depending if respectively an Initial Owner, an n-Blockholders or a Liquidity
Shareholders ownership structure emerges. The exact values of wE,ι are given in equations (22)-(24)
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in the Appendix.
We partition the equilibria into two types: Monitoring Equilibria and Non-monitoring Equi-
libria. The next proposition characterizes what happens when the initial owner chooses not to
monitor.
Lemma 6. In any equilibrium where µ = 0, the initial owner either does not raise capital, if
wE,L > 0 or sells the firm, if wE,L ≤ 0. When selling the firm the unique equilibrium which arises
is a Liquidity Shareholder EOS with Xmed = X̄, αE = 0 < m, wE = wE,L and each shareholder’s
stake is ᾱl.
Lemma 6 shows that when the initial owner chooses not to monitor he also exits from the firm
(αE = 0). The choice of αE > 0, µ = 0 is dominated by the choice of either selling the firm or
not raising capital. Since the initial owner acts as a monopolist in the pricing of shares and has no
constraints on his shareholdings from monitoring, he can extract the full rent of the firm without
incurring any risk by simply selling the firm (i.e. αE = 0, wE < 0). Investors are willing to buy
shares only if the value created is high enough to compensate for the risk. When this is not the
case, the initial owner does not raise capital (wE = αE = 0).
Since all agents have CARA utility with the same coefficient of risk aversion, the initial owner
cannot benefit from selling the firm to another agent who would then monitor. The Liquidity
Shareholder EOS is the only ownership structure which can arise when the initial owner sells the
entire firm.
In what follows, we will use the non-monitoring pay-off of the initial owner, i.e. the maximum
pay-off from either not raising capital (pay-off is 1) or selling (payoff is RX̄−K+1) as the reservation
utility that defines his participation constraint.
3. Equilibrium Ownership
This section analyzes the final step of the model, i.e. the initial owner’s choice of αE and wE . It
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibria with different possible
ownership structures, namely an n-Blockholder EOS (Section 3.1), an Initial Owner EOS (Section
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3.2), a Liquidity Shareholder EOS (Section 3.3) and a No Conflicts EOS (Section 3.4).
3.1 n-Blockholder Equilibria









then the only equilibrium ownership structure (with positive trade) is an n-Blockholder EOS.
In an n-Blockholder EOS, the initial owner chooses µ = 1, αE = m, wE = wE,n and the n
blockholders hold αn given by (6). The firm’s project, Xmed, is given by (4) with αj = αn and
liquidity shareholders’ position, αl,med, is given by (5).
The full expressions for α̃, α̂(1), M̄n(n) and mn(n) are given in the Appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that for intermediate monitoring costs the firm will have multiple
blockholders. In equilibrium the initial owner retains just enough shares to have an incentive to
monitor, i.e. αE = m (Lemma 1). When αE = m > ᾱ (condition (7)), the initial owner prefers
low risk/return projects, while outside investors prefer high returns even with higher risk. Hence,
there is an endogenous conflict of interests.
When some liquidity shareholders do not vote (λ < 1), there exists a parameter range such that
liquidity shareholders do not have the majority of votes cast (α̃ < αE = m) even if the initial owner
does not hold the majority of the shares (αE = m <
1
2). Without outside blockholders the initial
owner would have control and choose low risk/return. However, when m ≤ α̂(1) < 12 , a single active
shareholder prefers to deviate from being perfectly diversified, to becoming a (pivotal) blockholder
and changing the voting outcome towards a higher level of risk/return. Thus, the only possible type
of ownership structure has at least one outside blockholder. Proposition 1 highlights the fact that
it is not necessarily the largest shareholder who effectively determines a firm’s decisions. Instead,
mid-sized blockholders may have effective control.
Although all active investors are ex-ante identical, only some of them decide to become block-
holders. This is like in a (discrete) public goods provision problem: the outside blockholders
18
contribute to the public good (by increasing X) because the value of the public good to them is
sufficiently high. This allows some recipients of the public good (the liquidity shareholders) to
free-ride. This free-rider problem constitutes a coordination problem among investors and hence,
the number n of blockholders is not uniquely determined.
This also implies that allocations to liquidity shareholders are rationed and they would be
willing to pay a higher price for the shares.15 The difference between their willingness to pay
and the price set by the initial owner can be interpreted as IPO underpricing. Unlike the usual
public goods contribution game, however, when blockholders buy a larger block of shares, their
preferences over X change and are closer to those of the initial owner. This is why the presence of
blockholders mitigates, but does not remove, the conflict of interests between the initial owner and
outside investors.
Note that the initial owner could prevent blockholders’ entry by increasing his shareholding to
αE ≥ 12 to get full control.
16 This would, however, reduce the price at which he can sell shares,
because liquidity shareholders would then anticipate a less favourable choice of X. The initial
owner may therefore prefer having outside blockholders, which serve as a commitment device to
implement a more risky project, and allow him to sell the shares at a higher price. This result
differs from Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000), where the initial owner would
prefer not to have any blockholders so as not to share the private benefits of control, but the initial
owner is forced to bring blockholders on board because of capital constraints.
Alternatively, the initial owner can choose either not to monitor and exit from the firm, or not
to raise capital at all (see Lemma 6). Condition m ∈ [mn(n), M̄n(n)] ensures that the initial owner
prefers to have outside blockholders over either increasing his holdings to get full control, or exiting
the firm / not raising capital.
The initial owner chooses to retain the minimum fraction of shares to preserve the incentive
to monitor (αE = m). If he were to hold a larger (but still minority) stake (m < αE <
1
2), the
15The initial owner cannot take advantage of this, because increasing the share price would drive out the block-
holder(s), reducing the value of the shares to liquidity shareholders. Only when the initial owner could price discrim-
inate between blockholders and liquidity shareholders would this be possible.
16Remember that the initial owner is not capital constrained, and could therefore finance the whole project alone
(wE = K), possibly by borrowing. However, in equilibrium, he prefers to rely on outside equity in order to limit his
risk exposure.
19
blockholders would react by increasing their own holdings, preventing the initial owner from gaining
control. Although the resulting larger blockholdings would shift the vote outcome towards more
conservatism, its negative impact on the issue price coupled with an increase in the initial owner’s
risk exposure make such a move undesirable.
Note also that the initial owner cannot prevent blockholders’ entry by setting a different wE .
With wE = wE,n the initial owner extracts the maximum rent subject to satisfying blockholders’
participation constraints. If he sets a higher wE (a lower share price) he loses rent, without changing
the ownership structure. If he were to set a lower wE (higher price) outside shareholders’ participa-
tion constraint would be violated and there would be no demand for shares. Finally, note that wE,n
can be negative and αE > 0. In this case the capital raised from outside investors K −wE exceeds
the investment, K, required for the project. The initial owner retains the difference (−wE,n > 0),
which can be interpreted as a compensation for the monitoring costs and the entrepreneurial idea.
The next corollary shows that an n-Blockholder equilibria exist even when m > α̂(1), uniqueness











then there exists an n-Blockholder EOS with n ≥ 2.
When αE > α̂(1), the type of ownership structure is no longer unique. The initial owner now
has a large stake and therefore a single investor does not have an incentive to acquire the large
block required to counterbalance the initial owner. An n−Blockholder EOS still exists since several
strategic investors would be willing to jointly hold the required block. In addition there may exist
an Initial Owner EOS, as shown in the next section.
3.2 Initial Owner Equilibria
In this section we discuss the conditions under which an Initial Owner equilibrium arises. In this
ownership structure, the initial owner holds a block and there is a fringe of liquidity shareholders.
























































there exists an Initial Owner EOS and αE =
1
2 .
In an Initial Owner EOS, Xmed = XE , µ = 1, wE = wE,E and all outside investors are liquidity
shareholders with a stake equal to αl,E .
In cases (B), (C) and (D) this is the unique equilibrium with positive trade.




are given in the Appendix.
This proposition summarizes the four possible cases when an Initial Owner eauilibrium arises.
In such an equilibrium the initial owner is in control and chooses project XE . He invests just
enough capital to induce the liquidity shareholders to buy shares (wE = wE,E) and extracts all the
rent. Condition m ≤ M̄E ensures that the initial owner prefers ex-ante to monitor rather than not
to monitor.
In the first 2 instances, as we found in the n-Blockholder equilibrium, the initial owner retains
just enough shares to have an incentive to monitor, i.e. αE = m .
In case (B), the monitoring costs are so high, m > 1/2, that the initial owner holds more than
50% of the shares, so no outside investor can ever take control. In this case the Initial Owner
equilibrium is the only possible ownership structure (with positive trade).
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A less obvious result is that an Initial Owner equilibrium also exists when α̂(1) < m < 12 (case
(A)). In such a case the initial owner holds less than 50% of the shares and there is a conflict
of interest between initial owner and outside investors (αE = m > ᾱ and hence XE < X̄). As
m > α̂(1), no single active investor has a unilateral incentive to deviate to becoming a blockholder
in order to influence the voting decision. Here n active shareholders need to co-ordinate to buy
blocks and be in control (Corollary 1). If no co-ordination occurs, an Initial Owner equilibrium
arises.
There are two other cases when an Initial Owner equilibrium exists. The initial owner can
choose to hold more shares than strictly needed to satisfy the monitoring incentive compatibility
constraint. He chooses to do so in order to avoid the loss of full control in favour of the blockholders.
This occurs when the monitoring costs are either very low m < m 1
2
(case (C )) or very high, m > M̄ 1
2
(case (D)). If m is close to half, the cost of retaining more shares (relative to m) and getting full
control is relatively low: the initial owner does not lose much by way of diversification, but gets a
discontinuous jump in the benefit of control. When monitoring costs are low, yet the conflicts of
interest are large (X̄ ≥ Xn >> XE), the initial owner faces a large cost from ceding control. For
this reason he prefers to increase αE to a point where he can control the vote outcome, i.e. αE =
1
2 .
3.3 Liquidity Shareholder Equilibrium











then the only equilibrium ownership structure (with positive trade) is a Liquidity Shareholder
EOS. The equilibrium is characterized by Xmed = X̄, µ = 1, αE = m, and wE = wE,L and outside
investors hold ᾱl.
The full expression for M̄L is given in the Appendix.
A Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium exists when the monitoring costs are sufficiently low (m ≤
α̃) so that there are enough active liquidity shareholders to be pivotal, but not so low as to render
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conflicts of interest negligible (i.e. m > ᾱ). In this equilibrium, the liquidity shareholders are in
control, while the initial owner retains just enough shares to monitor, αE = m and invests just
enough capital to induce the liquidity shareholders to buy shares (wE = wE,L).
Note that the initial owner could always choose to retain a strictly higher fraction of shares
to induce a n-Blockholder ownership structure (m < αE < 1/2) or remain in control himself
(αE = 1/2 > m). In either of these cases, the vote outcome would be closer to his own preferred
project. However, the higher control comes at the expense of a lower price, more dilution and a
less diversified portfolio for the initial owner. For this reason the initial owner strictly prefers the
Liquidity Shareholder ownership structure. Finally, condition m ≤ M̄L ensures that the initial
owner prefers ex-ante to monitor rather than not to monitor.
3.4 No Conflicts of Interest Equilibrium
We finally show under which parameters the equilibrium features no conflicts of interest among
shareholders.





ᾱ, M̄E , 1
]]
. (14)
In this equilibrium, Xmed = X̄, µ = 1, αE = m, wE = wE,L
Now the monitoring costs are so low (m ≤ ᾱ) that the initial owner’s stake is small enough to
remove any conflict of interest with outside investors: everybody now agrees that the firm should
move to the corner of maximum risk/return X̄. In this case it is immaterial who has a majority
of votes cast, so we do not further analyze the identity of the class of shareholders that has an
effective majority.
Figure 2 provides a graphic representation of the equilibria as a function of the monitoring
costs, m, and the invested capital, K.
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—INSERT Fig2 here—
As the monitoring costs increase we move from an equilibrium with no conflicts of interest
among shareholders to a situation where liquidity shareholders are in control, to an n-Blockholder
equilibrium and finally to an Initial Owner equilibrium.
Increasing the capital required for the investment induces the initial owner not to invest money
as the investment becomes unprofitable. On the other hand, when the capital required is low but
the monitoring cost is high the value of monitoring is limited and hence the initial owner prefers
not to monitor and sell the firm.17
4. Comparative Statics and Empirical Implications
In this section we explore the empirical predictions of our model. For each model parameter, we
investigate the effects first on the possible equilibria, then on the size of the blocks and finally on
the firm’s risk and value.
The effect of agency problems
A key parameter determining ownership structure is the monitoring cost m, which can be
interpreted more broadly as a proxy for the level of agency problems in the firm. As we saw
in Lemma 1, the value of m is directly proportional to the required stake of the initial owner.18
We showed that the ownership structure depends on the size of the initial owner’s stake: when
the initial owner has an intermediate stake (agency problems are significant but not very severe),
multiple blockholders emerge (Proposition 1). If the initial owner’s required stake is very high
(very severe agency problems), the initial owner is predicted to be the only large shareholder: he
exercises control while the remaining shares are dispersed among liquidity shareholders, who hold
17The precise parameter range for which the owner sells out or does not raise capital is obtained from the violation
of the initial owner’s participation constraint (see proofs of Propositions 1-4).
18This element is common to all the models where the initial owner arises to monitor or is manager of the firm,
but not to all the models on ownership structure (e.g. Zwiebel (1995) and Bolton and von Thadden (1998)).
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the optimally diversified portfolio (Proposition 2). When the initial owner’s required stake is very
low (low agency problems), the firm is widely held (Propositions 3 and 4).
An important implication of our model is that it is not necessarily the largest shareholder who
determines firm’s choices, but rather the pivotal one: the median shareholder can be the initial
owner, the blockholders or the liquidity shareholders, and it is his/her size that determines the
firm’s risk choices (see Lemma 2). Our model suggests that less concentrated ownership structures
should be correlated with higher firm risk. This is a novel result in the theoretical literature. To the
best of our knowledge there is no empirical study that specifically focuses on the issue of ownership
structure and risk, although some authors present indirect evidence consistent with our predictions.
Carlin and Mayer (2003) show that high risk firms have multiple blockholders, while low risk firms
usually have a single large shareholder. John et al. (2008) demonstrate a negative relationship
between ownership concentration and risk. Laeven and Levine (2008) focus on ownership structure
of banks and show that the risk-taking behaviour of banks depends on the ownership structure:
banks with at least one blockholder are more conservative than firms with dispersed ownership.
Finally, Faccio et al. (2011) find that firm’s risk choices are positively correlated with the degree
of diversification of the largest shareholder which is consistent with our theory. In addition we
predict that risk choices should depend on the stake of the second blockholder, if there is one.
Therefore, it would be interesting to extend this study to analyse the role of the other blockholders
in determining the firm’s risk choices.
In our model the presence of blockholders also increases firm value.19 This prediction is com-
mon to models where blockholders have a governance role (Kahn and Winton (1998), Maug (1998),
Admati and Pfleiderer (2009), and Edmans and Manso (2011)), but differs from theories where
blockholders can decrease value because of overmonitoring (Burkart et al. (1997)) or inefficient
monitoring (Winton (1993)). In Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Edmans (2009) a blockholder
has both a governance role and reduces liquidity of share trading. In our case blockholders increase
value not because they discipline managers (the initial owner does that), but because they miti-
gate the conflict of interest among shareholders. Empirically, with the exception of Konijn et al.
19In the model n-Blockholder equilibria are often the only possible equilibria. In such cases, blockholders increase
value in the sense that the alternative of having an initial owner in control would destroy value.
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(2011), an inverse relationship between firm value and ownership structure concentration has been
documented in numerous studies (Barclay and Holderness (1989), Kirchmaier and Grant (2005),
Lehmann and Weigand (2000), Volpin (2002), Roosenboom and Schramade (2006), Faccio et al.
(2001) and Maury and Pajuste (2005)). These studies confirm the relationship between value and
concentration, but they are unable to pin down the mechanism through which this occurs.
Unlike Zwiebel (1995) our model predicts that the size of the second blockholder’s stake is
positively related to that of the initial owner (Lemma 5). In our model, blockholders need to hold
a larger stake when the initial owner’s stake is bigger, so as to counterbalance his voting power.
Moreover, in those firms that have multiple blocks, we would expect the largest block to be larger
than the sum of the remaining blockholdings (see equation (6)).
Turning to predictions on risk and return, as the number of blockholders, n, increases, the size of
each of the blocks decreases (Lemma 5) and the risk/return of the firm increases (Lemma 4): when
there are several blockholders, each one can be smaller and still counterbalance the initial large
shareholder. In line with these predictions, Carlin and Mayer (2000) find a positive relationship
between the size of the largest blockholder and the second and third blockholders. Moreover, when
a third blockholder is present, the size of the second is much smaller and similar to the third one.
The effect of voting participation by liquidity shareholders
When there is an n-Blockholder ownership structure, an increase in the vote participation of
liquidity shareholders, λ, reduces the size of the median block, αn. A higher λ has two effects on
ownership structure. When λ increases, an outside investor can hold a smaller block and be pivotal
(see equation (6)). This reduces a blockholder’s risk exposure and shifts the voting outcome closer
to her initial ideal project, lowering outside investor’s opportunity cost of becoming a blockholder.
In Figure 2 this corresponds to a shift to the right of α̃. At the same time, when m is low, a higher
λ makes it easier for liquidity shareholders to gain control and so there is no need for blockholders.
Thus, the parameter range for the liquidity shareholder ownership structure widens. In Figure 2,
this corresponds to a shift to the right of α̂. Overall then an increase in the participation of liquidity
shareholders reduces ownership concentration. (See Lemma 17 in the Appendix for proofs of these
statements.)
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Note also that a larger vote participation by liquidity shareholders shifts the decision away from
the initial owner’s preferred project. This reduces his willingness to raise capital or to monitor
(Lemma 17 in the Appendix).
Because of these opposite effects of liquidity shareholders’ vote participation on the cost of
issuing shares, the initial owner prefers some degree of passiveness of the outside investors. It can
be shown that the optimal λ from the initial owner’s perspective is always smaller than 1. The
initial owner therefore has incentives to create an environment that hinders vote participation, at
least up to a point. Only under some circumstances would he prefer a total exclusion of liquidity
shareholders, i.e. λ = 0, or of outside investors in general. The initial owner prefers some voting
liquidity shareholders to ease the rise of blockholders who in turn serve as a commitment device
to choose a high risk/return project and hence to set a lower price (see also the discussion on dual
class shares in section 5.1). This point is line with Becht et al. (2003) who point out that there is a
trade-off between favouring minority shareholders and monitoring of managers: too much minority
protection can reduce the incentive to monitor.
In practice participation of liquidity shareholders can be influenced by the institutional details
of how voting is carried out. For example, the ability to vote by proxy greatly reduces the cost
of voting. Similarly, information disclosure regulation may affect the cost for a shareholder to
take informed decisions and thereby impact vote participation by small dispersed shareholders.
The Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) reports, although costly, can help to take informed
decisions and hence to increase vote participation. Although the ISS also makes recommendations
on how to vote freely available, this does not necessarily eliminate absenteeism: when choosing
risk/return of a project, shareholders’ preferred choices depend on their stake. There is therefore
not one recommendation that all investors agree upon. Since the ISS’s recommendations target
institutional shareholders, it is not necessarily in the best interest of liquidity shareholders to follow
them. Although improvements in the availability of information are unlikely to generate 100%
vote participation in practice, we would expect them to increase λ and thereby reduce ownership
concentration.
The effect of the potential conflicts-of-interests
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Potential conflicts of interests can be due to different factors: growth opportunities of the
firm, profitability or riskiness of the sector where the firm operates and finally the risk aversion of
investors.
The parameter X̄ captures the availability of important growth opportunities for the firm.
The larger the growth opportunities, or the higher is X̄, the bigger is the interval of m for which
blockholder ownership structures emerge (Lemma 18 in the Appendix). As discussed above, the
main driving force for outside investors to become blockholders in our model is that there are
conflicts of interest between the initial owner and outside investors. In keeping with this logic,
blockholders’ incentives to hold blocks increase with the degree of conflicts (formally, the incentive
constraint to become a blockholder is less binding). Growth opportunities therefore affect the
ownership equilibrium outcome. The initial owner, as a large undiversified investor, is not willing
to take full advantage of these growth opportunities. The emergence of blockholders allows these
growth opportunities to be exploited.20 Blockholders however choose their shareholdings in order
to become pivotal. Thus, growth opportunities (measured by X̄) determine whether blockholders
emerge, but not the size of their stakes which depends on the fraction of shares held by the initial
owner.
Furthermore, ceteris paribus, in more mature sectors, characterized by a choice only of relatively
low risk projects (low X̄), ownership structures with multiple blockholders are less likely to be
observed. In very innovative industries (high X̄), on the other hand, we should observe multiple
blockholders. In such cases, blockholders could be represented by institutional investors, e.g. private
equity funds who look for firms with a high risk/return profile.21
Alternatively the conflicts of interest among shareholders can be affected by the risk/return
ratio of the sector in which the firm operates, i.e. σ
2
R . The initial owner’s share participation
cannot be reduced due to the monitoring incentive compatibility. When the sector’s risk/return
ratio increases, his preferred project therefore features a lowers X. This corresponds to an increase
in the conflicts of interests with the outside investors whose preferred project is the maximum risk,
20We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this to our attention.
21Note that even though private equity funds may be diversified to some degree, they often hold only a small
number of portfolio companies, leaving them with significant exposure to idiosyncratic risk.
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i.e. X̄.
Empirically we would therefore expect that the difference in risk profile between firms with one
or more blockholders and those with a dispersed ownership structure to be larger in riskier sectors.
Moreover, larger conflicts resulting from a higher σ
2
R favour the emergence of blockholders.
The risk/return ratio also affects the participation constraint of investors. The larger is the
risk/return ratio, the lower is the price the initial owner can charge as investors demand to be
compensated for the higher risk. This tightens the initial owner’s participation constraint, implying
that he prefers not to raise capital or to sell the firm.
Finally, risk aversion also affects the conflicts of interest, despite the fact that all investors,
including the initial owner, have the same degree of risk aversion. An increase in risk aversion
affects ownership structure and risk choices in the same way as an increase in the risk/return
ratio: the larger risk aversion, the larger is the difference in risk choices among firms with different
ownership structures, the wider the range of parameters for which blockholders arise and the lower
is the price at which shares are issued.
The effect of the capital invested
The amount of capital needed for the project, K, is a measure of the project profitability: the
value of the project is RX −K (1− µ (1−m)), which is decreasing in K. The amount of capital
however per se does not affect the magnitude of a firm’s risk. Hence, as it can be seen in Fig. 2,
the capital needed for the project, K, does not influence the ownership structure.
At the same time, the amount of capital invested does affect the initial owner’s participation
constraint. For a fixed m, as K increases, the extra capital needed has to be contributed by the
initial owner. That is because the outside investors’ participation constraint is always binding in
equilibrium. Hence, the initial owner’s participation constraint gets tighter as K increases (see Fig.
2). This suggests that if the capital needed is very high, monitoring equilibria are less likely.
Ownership structure and underpricing
Our paper offers an alternative explanation for the relationship between underpricing in IPOs
and ownership structure observed by Brennan and Franks (1997), Boulton et al. (2010), Nagata and
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Rhee (2009) and Yeh et al. (2008). In our n-Blockholder equilibrium, liquidity shareholders free-
ride on blockholders in the sense that they would be willing to pay a higher price for the shares than
the price set by the initial owner. In particular, the larger is the differential between the size of the
blocks and the size of the minority stakes, the higher is the rent that diversified shareholders obtain
and the higher the extent of underpricing. As in Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and DeMarzo and
Urosevic (2006), our theory predicts that underpricing occurs when blockholders are present and
is higher, the larger the size of outside blockholdings. This prediction contrasts with models where
blockholders arise so as to extract private benefits of control or expropriate minority shareholders
(see for example Grossman and Hart (1980), Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)).
However, while in Stoughton and Zechner (1998) and DeMarzo and Urosevic (2006) underpricing
occurs so as to guarantee the participation of a single large shareholder who must undertake costly




The model assumes a one-share-one-vote rule in order to determine voting power. Of course, this
rule may not be optimal in all contexts (see, for example, Burkart and Lee (2008) and Adams
and Ferreira (2008)) and we therefore investigate an extension where cash flow and voting rights
are independent choice variables. In this case the initial owner would retain the same cash flow
rights as in the basic model in order to satisfy his monitoring incentive compatibility constraint.
However, he could undermine the emergence of outside blockholders by allocating fewer voting
rights to outside equity. The next lemma shows that even if the initial owner had this possibility,
in some parameter range, he would still prefer to release control to blockholders.
Lemma 7. The initial owner prefers an n-Blockholders ownership structure over issuing dual class
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When the number of blockholders is sufficiently low, the initial owner prefers to have block-
holders rather than issuing dual class shares. The reasoning goes back to the intuition discussed
in section 3.1. The blockholders are a commitment device for the initial owner to choose a high
risk/return project. This allows him to demand a higher share price. When the number of block-
holers is high, the difference in the risk profile between the initial owner’s preferred project and
the one actually arising from the vote becomes very large. In such a case the initial owner would
prefer, if possible, issuing dual class shares and retaining control.
5.2 Vote trading
An interesting question is if vote trading could affect vote participation and thus ownership struc-
ture. Christoffersen et al. (2007) document the existence of a market for votes. Although ab-
senteeism continues to be observed even when votes can be traded, it would be interesting to
incorporate this possibility in the model. The implications of such a market are not obvious. When
the vote borrower is anonymous (as is the case in practice according to Christoffersen et al. (2007)),
it is not clear whether a passive investor ends up selling his vote to the initial owner or a block-
holder. One would have to check who has the highest willingness to pay in order to determine
how vote trading would affect the voting outcome. Moreover, if votes are traded at positive prices
(which will presumably be the case since initial owner and blockholders compete to buy them), this
needs to be factored into investor’s initial demand for shares. Therefore allowing for vote trading
does not simply amount to setting λ = 1 in the current model.
5.3 Number of Blockholders
One of the main results of the paper is that blockholders arise endogenously to mitigate the conflict
of interest between the initial owner and outside investors. For some parameter values this is
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the only equilibrium ownership structure. Although the type of ownership structure is uniquely
determined, the number n of blockholders is not. A natural question to ask is what the optimal
number of blockholders would be from the initial owner’s point of view. This would then predict
the number of blockholders in a situation where the initial owner could choose the number of
blockholders, for example in a closely held corporation.
Lemma 8. In a n-Blockholder equilibrium, the optimal number of blockholders for the initial







The preferred number of blockholders for the initial owner stems from the following trade-off.
On the one hand, a smaller number of blockholders means that each of them holds a larger stake,
which pushes the equilibrium choice of risk closer to the initial owner’s preference. On the other
hand, the larger stake increases risk exposure of blockholders reducing the price they are willing to
pay.22
The initial owner therefore does not always prefer the lowest number of blockholders (unlike
in Zwiebel (1995) and Bennedsen and Wolfenzon (2000)). When the monitoring costs, m, or the
fraction of active liquidity shareholders, λ, increase, the optimal number n∗ of blockholders goes
down. Higher monitoring costs imply a higher fraction of shares held by the initial owner and hence
a lower preferred risk/return. Thus the initial owner would prefer fewer (but larger) blockholders
who push down the equilibrium risk/return profile (∂n
∗
∂m is negative for m ≥ 2λ > α̃).
Similarly when more liquidity shareholders vote (λ goes up), a fixed number of blockholders
could hold smaller blocks and still be jointly pivotal. This drives the vote to a higher risk/return
combination - further away from the initial owner’s preference. Thus, when λ is high, the initial
owner prefers fewer blockholders (∂n
∗
∂λ is negative for m ≤
1
2).
22 The reduction in project risk, is a second order effect which is dominated by the negative impact of the greater
risk exposure generated by larger stakes. The price impact is therefore unambiguously negative.
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6. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the determinants of ownership structure and its effect on the risk profile of
a firm when decisions are taken through shareholder voting. The need for monitoring renders
a large shareholder beneficial to the firm. Because of his large stake, he is more conservative
regarding the firm’s risk profile than well diversified shareholders, leading to a conflict of interest.
We show that this provides incentives for mid-sized blockholders to emerge so as to mitigate the
conflicts of interests between the largest and minority shareholders. We use the model to explain
different ownership structures observed in reality: one large shareholder with a fringe of minority
shareholders when the moral hazard problem is severe, multiple mid-sized blocks for an medium
degree of moral hazard and fully dispersed ownership when the moral hazard is mild.
The model provides a framework to explain a variety of phenomena reported in empirical studies
such as the positive relationship between the presence of blockholders and firm value, ownership
concentration and risk or the role of ownership in IPO underpricing. An important message of our
paper is that there is a clear distinction between ownership structures with one large shareholder
and those with multiple intermediate-sized blockholders, both in terms of the conditions under
which they occur as well as their implications for firm choices.
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A.1.1 Equilibrium definition. Below we provide a definition for equilibria with positive trade.
Equilibrium is a monitoring level, µ ∈ {0, 1}, a fraction α∗E of shares held, a fraction of wealth
invested w∗E by the initial owner, a decision X
∗
med and an allocation of shares among investors, α
∗
such that: (i) α∗E and w
∗
E maximize the utility of the initial owner given the anticipated demand,
the anticipated monitoring level, µ, and the anticipated ownership structure α: (ii) each active




E , the anticipated µ and the anticipated
shares of all other active investors; (iii) Each passive investor chooses αi,D to maximize his utility
given w∗E , α
∗
E and the anticipated µ and Xmed; (iv) in equilibrium there must be full subscription;
(v) the value enhancing decision must be optimal for the initial owner given his stake and the vote
outcome; (vi) expectations are rational.
A.2 The Equilibrium Ownership Structure
A.2.1 Monitoring Incentives and Voting Game. Proof of Lemma 1: At date 3, the
ownership structure, α, and thus Xmed are already fixed. Given the initial owner’s objective














Rearranging the condition yields αE ≥ m is obtained.
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Proof of Lemma 2: We maximize the objective functions (over X) of the outside investors,
(2), and of the initial owner, (3), given the fraction of shares held, αj .
A.2.2 Ownership Subgame. Proof of Lemma 4:






. Plugging it into
equation (2), investor i’s utility function is decreasing in αi if Xi > X̄ and
K−wE
1−αE > µK. Thus,
investor i’s ideal project is X = X̄ and the corresponding optimal shares are ᾱl.
Proof of Lemma 5: We prove (A) αn > αl,med; (B) αn =
αE(1+λ)−λ
(1−λ)n ; (C) αE > αn.
(A) To see that αn > αl,med, we reason by contradiction. Suppose that αn < αl,med with X = Xmed.
In such a case the blockholder could do better holding αn = αl,med keeping X = Xmed. Hence,
αn < αl,med cannot be an EOS as it contradicts part a) of Definition 3.
(B) Because investor i’s utility function is decreasing in αi if
K−wE
1−αE > µK, a blockholder arises iff
he can change Xmed, that is iff an n-Blockholder EOS arises. To win the vote, the n blockholders
and a fraction λ of liquidity shareholders who are active, should have at least the same votes as
the initial owner, that is: αE ≤ nαn + λ(1− αE + nαn). Solving this equation proves:
αn ≥
αE (1 + λ)− λ
(1− λ)n
(18)
Denote respectively with Ul,med and Un,med the value functions of a liquidity shareholder and of a
blockholder when X = Xmed. We define also Xn the Xmed in an n-Blockholders EOS.
Consider first the case where Xmed = Xn < X̄, shareholder n is the median shareholder and αn > ᾱ.
Using equation (2), the utility of the median shareholder is:
Un,n = 1 + αn
(










By Lemma 2 and the fact that Xmed = Xn < X̄, this is equivalent to
Un,n = αn(µK −
K − wE
1− αE




By assumption, µK − K−wE1−αE < 0, hence Un,n is decreasing in αn.
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If Xmed = Xn = X̄, we have that Un,n is decreasing in αn because ᾱl < αn. Hence, a blockholder
will not hold more than the minimum needed to change the vote decision, i.e.:
αn ≤
αE (1 + λ)− λ
(1− λ)n
(21)
From (18) and (21) part (B) follows.
(C) To see that αE > αn, we reason by contradiction. Suppose that αE ≤ αn. From part
(B), we know that Un,n is decreasing in αn and an investor is better off setting αn = αE . But
this implies that Xmed = X1 ≥ XE and de facto the outside investor does not affect the vote
outcome. Hence, he prefers to be a liquidity shareholder and his optimal shareholding is given by
αl,E . Contradiction.
A.2.3 The EOS. In this part, we provide sufficient conditions under which various EOS exist
for different pairs of (αE , wE) ∈ S ≡ [0, 1]× (−∞,∞). This is needed since, in order to show that
a putative equilibrium is subgame perfect, we must look at what happens off the equilibrium path.
Define η = (K−wE)/N(1−αE), the fraction corresponding to one share (recall that we assume
a finite number of shares). Define wE,ι with ι = E,n, L the minimum wealth that the initial owner
needs to pledge to guarantee a positive demand of outside investors respectively in the Initial
Owner, n-Blockholder and for the Liquidity Shareholder EOS:
wE,E(αE) ≡ K − (RXE + µK) (1− αE) + εE (22)
wE,n(αE) ≡ K −
(











(1− αE) + εL (24)
where ει with ι = {E,L} is the extra initial owner’s investment needed to guarantee a strictly
positive liquidity shareholders’ participation and hence a positive demand, i.e. εj ≡ γX2j σ2η. Note
that when XE = X̄, wE,E = wE,L.
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In addition we need the following notation:
w(αE) ≡ K − µK(1− αE) (25)
α̂1(n) ≡
2λ





λ2 + 4ᾱ(1− λ)n (ᾱ(1− λ)n− 1− 2ᾱ(1 + λ))
2 (1 + λ)
(27)




Suppose αE is fixed, then w(αE) is the maximum wE such that µK ≤ K−wE1−αE . α̂(n) = {αE |αE ≤
α̂(n) =⇒ wE,E ≥ wE,n}. α̂(n) = α̂1(n) when Xn < X̄, and α̂(n) = α̂2(n) when Xn = X̄. Finally





















there exists an Initial Owner EOS, with Xmed = XE < X̄. If wE < wE,E there is a no Trade EOS.
Proof An Initial Owner EOS exists if conditions of Definition 3 are satisfied:
1. Investors choose αi optimally.
Suppose αE >
1
2 . The supporting beliefs of investors are that all other investors buy αl,E .
Given the majority rule, outside investors cannot influence the vote outcome, the initial
owner is pivotal, X = XE . Hence, because wE ≤ w =⇒ µK ≤ K−wE1−αE , the optimal choice
for outside investors is αl,E .
When αE <
1
2 , an Initial Owner EOS exists iff no single (active) investor has a unilateral
incentive to deviate from αl,E . The only possible deviation is for the investor to buy a
sufficiently large block and be able to change the vote outcome Xmed. However, since wE,E ≤
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wE ≤ wE,1, Ul,E > 1 > U1,1, no liquidity shareholder has a unilateral incentive to deviate.
2. Beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
3. wE ≥ wE,E guarantees that investors buy a strictly positive fraction of shares. Since there
are sufficiently many outside investors, there is full subscription.
4. Since the above conditions hold for any arbitrary choice of µ ∈ {0, 1}, they are consistent
with any monitoring choice and, in particular, with µ ∈ arg maxUE,med.
When wE < wE,E , investors demand a non positive fraction of shares and so we assume that
the beliefs are that no-one buys a positive amount of shares. Thus, there is a No Trade EOS.
Corollary 2. There exists an EOS with no conflicts, i.e. with Xmed = XE = X̄ if






If wE < wE,E there is No Trade EOS.
Proof When αE ∈ (0, ᾱ] there are no conflicts of interests between outside investors and the initial
owner, Xmed = XE = X̄. The rest of the proof follows the same steps as the proof of Lemma 9 just












wE ∈ [wE,n(αE), w(αE)) (35)
there exists an n-Blockholder EOS, with Xmed = Xn ≤ X̄. If wE < wE,n there is a No Trade EOS.
Proof An n-Blockholder EOS exists if conditions of Definition 3 are satisfied:
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1. Investors choose αi optimally.
We first look at the optimal blockholders’ choice. The supporting beliefs of investors are that
exactly n−1 other outside investors buy αn fraction of shares and together with a fraction λ of
liquidity shareholders, who hold αl,n, vote for Xn. From Lemma 5, blockholders arises if they
are pivotal and shift decision closer to their first best X = X̄. To be able to shift decision, the
necessary conditions are: 1) αE > α̃, i.e. without blockholders liquidity shareholders cannot
be pivotal and choose X = X̄; 2) αE ≤ 12 , i.e. the initial owner is not necessarily in control
and so blockholders can become pivotal; αE ≤ α̂(n), i.e. no blockholder can do better by
deviating as long as Un,n ≥ Ul,E (this is the best deviation possible, if any block is reduced
by even one share the decision shifts to XE). Since wE ≤ w, Un,n is decreasing in αn so a
blockholder holds just enough shares to be pivotal.
We now show that there is no profitable unilateral deviation of liquidity shareholders: αl,n
maximizes a liquidity shareholder’s utility given Xn. The only reason to hold a different
fraction is to change Xmed. To achieve that a liquidity shareholder can buy more shares than
αn but this will end up shifting X towards a lower value than Xn so further away from his
first best and be undiversified.
2. Beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
3. Both blockholders and liquidity investors demand a strictly positive fraction of shares. Since
there are sufficiently many outside investors, there is full subscription.
4. Since the above conditions hold for any arbitrary choice of µ ∈ {0, 1}, they are consistent
with any monitoring choice, in particular, with µ ∈ arg maxUE,med.
When wE < wE,n the investors’ participation constraint is not satisfied and so we assume that the












wE(αE) ≥ [wE,L(αE), w(αE)) (37)
there exists a Liquidity Shareholder EOS. If wE < wE,L there is a no Trade EOS.
Proof A Liquidity Shareholder EOS exists if conditions of Definition 3 are satisfied:
1. Investors choose αi optimally: The supporting beliefs of investors are that all others buy
exactly ᾱl and Xmed = X̄. αE ≤ α̃ guarantees that Xmed = X̄. No liquidity shareholder wants to
increase or decrease his shareholdings since this is the most preferred project (see Lemma 4).
2. Beliefs are correct in equilibrium.
3. wE ≥ wE,E guarantees that outside investors demand a strictly positive fraction of shares.
Hence, all shares are subscribed.
4. Since the above conditions hold for any arbitrary choice of µ ∈ {0, 1}, they are consistent
with any monitoring choice, in particular, with µ ∈ arg maxUE,med.
When wE < wE,L the investors’ participation constraint is not satisfied and so we assume that
the beliefs are that no-one demand a positive amount shares. Thus, there is a No Trade EOS.
Corollary 3. If wE(αE) ≥ w(αE), there is an EOS where the initial owner holds αE and one
investor holds α1 = 1− αE . Xmed = min[XE , X1].
Proof If wE(αE) ≥ w(αE), Ui(αi) is increasing in αi. Each investor demands all the shares
tendered. The rest of the proof follows the steps of the previous Lemma.
Proof of Lemma 6: We apply backward induction. Suppose the initial owner raises capital
he maximizes the following objective function:
max
αE ,wE




2σ2α2E + 1− wE (38)
subject to the condition to have a positive demand of shares by outside investors: wE ≥ wE,ι with
ι = {E,n, L}.
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Substituting for wE,ι in the objective function, it can be checked that UE (µ = 0) is decreasing
in αE for all wE,ι, for Xmed ≤ X̄. Therefore, αE = 0 is the optimal choice of the initial owner
for any ownership structure. In this case, the only possible ownership structure is the Liquidity
Shareholder EOS with Xmed = X̄.
To satisfy the participation constraint of outside investors, wE ≥ wE,L. Because UE (µ = 0) is
decreasing in wE , wE = wE,L and the initial owner’s utility is given by RX̄ −K + 1. If he invests
in the risk free asset his utility is 1. Hence, the initial owner’s value function, defined as VE,NM , is
then given by equation:
VE,NM = max[RX̄ −K + 1, 1] (39)
We now show that if the initial owner chooses not to monitor then no other outside investor would
choose to hold a block and monitor. The utility from monitoring of an outside investor is smaller
than the utility from monitoring of the initial owner iff:
αn(RX +K)− (K −wE,n)αn−
γ
2




From equation (23), (K − wE,n) > 0. Thus, no outside investor wants to monitor.
A.3 Monitoring Equilibria
Lemma 12. In any equilibrium where µ = 1, K−wE1−αE > K.
Proof Consider first an EOS where no blockholders exist. Suppose to the contrary, that there
is an equilibrium with K−wE1−αE < K. From Lemma 3 investors demand all the shares (the utility
function is increasing in αi). Hence, the initial owner can increase his utility by decreasing wE , and
ensure a strictly positive demand. The initial owner will do this until K−wE1−αE ≥ K. Contradiction.
We now present few lemmas which provide expressions for the value function of the initial owner
under the alternative ownership structures that could be obtained. They will be needed to prove
the existence of the equilibria.
The following lemmas use the intervals of the EOS described in Section A.2.3. However, given
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Lemma 12 the requirement wE < w
E
is ignored w.l.o.g..
Lemma 13. Suppose the conditions of Corollary 2 are satisfied, and the equilibrium of the game
is the one with no conflicts with Xmed = X̄, then the initial owner sets αE = m, wE = wE,E and
the value function of the initial owner, defined as VE,NC , is given by:
VE,NC = RX̄ + 1−
γ
2
X̄2m2σ2 −mK − εL (41)
Proof By Lemma 1, in any monitoring equilibrium, αE ≥ m. By Corollary 2, the EOS with no








2 + 1− wE −mK (42)
s.t wE ≥ wE,E (43)
αE ∈ [m, ᾱ] (44)
As UE is decreasing in the wealth invested, wE , the initial owner chooses wE such that it
satisfies the participation constraint of the liquidity shareholders, (43), with a strictly positive
demand. Inserting it in the initial owner’s objective function we obtain:
RX̄ + 1− γ
2
X̄2α2Eσ
2 −mK − εL (45)
This expression is decreasing in αE . Hence the initial owner retains just enough shares to satisfy
the monitoring constraint: αE = m. Inserting αE = m in the initial owner’s utility function,
expression (41) results.








Lemma 14. Suppose the conditions of Lemma 9 are satisfied and the equilibrium of the game is
an Initial Owner equilibrium, then Xmed = XE < X̄, wE = wE,E , αE = max[m, b], and the value
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function of the initial owner, defined as VE,E , is:













+ 1−mK − εE (46)
Proof The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 13 using Lemmas 1 and 9.
Detailed proof is available upon request.
Lemma 15. Suppose the conditions of the n-Blockholder EOS are satisfied (Lemma 10) and the
equilibrium of the game is an n-Blockholder equilibrium with Xmed = Xn, the initial owner sets
αE = max[m, α̃], wE = wE,n and the value function of the initial owner, defined as VE,n, is:




2(max[m, α̃]2 + αn − αn max[m, α̃]) (47)
Proof The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 13 and it applies Lemmas
1 and 10. Detailed proof is available upon request.
Lemma 16. Suppose the conditions for the Liquidity Shareholder EOS are satisfied and there
exists a Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium with monitoring. Then, αE = max[m, ᾱ], wE = wE,L
and the value function of the initial owner, defined as VE,L, is:
VE,L = RX̄ + 1−mK −
γ
2
X̄2σ2(max[m, ᾱ])2 − εL (48)
Proof The proof follows the same steps as for the proof of Lemma 13 and it applies Lemmas
1 and 11. Detailed proof is available upon request.















where M̄n,RC(n) and mn,RC(n) are the first two biggest solutions of the equation VE,n = 1. M̄n,S(n)














8(3n− 1)λ2 + (4− 24n)λ
)









8(3n− 1)λ2 + (4− 24n)λ
)
11n2(1− λ)2 + (n(1− λ)− (1 + λ))2
(52)
We solve the game by backward induction. The initial owner chooses αE and wE , anticipating





; (2) αE ∈ [12 , 1]; (3) αE ∈ [0,m]. We first describe the beliefs on the EOS and the
corresponding value functions in each of these intervals.
Case (1). By Lemma 1, µ = 1. All investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We assume the
following beliefs about the EOS at date 1: if wE ≥ wE,n the anticipated EOS is the n-Blockholder
one which exists by Lemma 10. By Lemma 15 in such a case the initial owner’s value function, VE,n,
is given by equation (47). If wE < wE,n then the EOS is the No Trade EOS with corresponding
value function equal to 1.
Case (2). By Lemma 1, µ = 1. If wE ≥ wE,E there exists an Initial Owner EOS (Lemma 9). By
the proof of Lemma 14, he minimizes αE , i.e. αE =
1
2 and his value function is therefore:





+ 1−mK − εE (53)
Case (3). In this interval Proposition 6 applies. The initial owner’s value function is VE,NM =
max
[
1, RX̄ −K + 1
]
.
It is sufficient to check that under condition 7, VE,n ≥ max(VE,E |αE= 12 , VE,NM ). Note that
VE,n ≥ VE,E |αE= 12 , iff m ∈ [m 12 , M̄ 12 ].
Second we check that VE,n ≥ VE,NM :
(i) VE,n ≥ 1 iff:
n(1− λ)λR2 +m
(




The left hand side is a third degree inequality which goes from −∞ to ∞, and it is positive at
m = λ1+λ . Note also that when m =
1
2 , the left hand side can be either positive or negative. Hence,
of the 3 potential roots for which the left hand side is equal to 0, we are interested to the two biggest
ones and the negative values are between these two values, that is mn,RC(1) < m < M̄n,RC(1).






2(1 + λ)2 − ᾱn(1− λ)(λ+ 1)
)
− n(1− λ)− 2ᾱKγ
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2Kγλ(3λ+ 2)σ2 − nR2(1− λ)
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The left hand side has the same features of the left hand side of condition (54). Hence this condition
is satisfied when mn,S(1) < m < M̄n,S(1).
Hence VE,n ≥ VE,NM under the conditions of the proposition.
It remains to prove is that no other equilibrium ownership structure (except the No Trade
equilibrium) exists in this interval. Since m > α̃, the Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium is ruled
out. Similarly since m > ᾱ, the equilibrium with no conflicts is ruled out. Thus the only other
possible equilibrium in this interval is the Initial Owner equilibrium. Suppose such an equilibrium
exists, it implies that the belief of the investors is n = 0 and all investors are liquidity shareholders
each holding αl,E . Since m ≤ α̂(1), a liquidity shareholder would find it worthwhile to switch to
holding a block. Contradiction.
Proof of Corollary 1: The proof is the same as Proposition 1, except that uniqueness of an n-
Blockholder equilibrium is no longer guaranteed: if m ∈ [α̂(1), α̂(n)), an Initial Owner equilibrium
exists as wE,E ≤ wE,n.
A.3.2 Initial Owner Equilibria. Proof of Proposition 2: The proof of parts (A) and (B)
follows the same steps as the proof of Proposition 1. Let M̄E ≡ min[M̄E,RC , M̄E,S ] where M̄E,RC
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and M̄E,S are respectively the solutions for m of:
R
(










2 = 0 (57)
We partition the maximization problem of the initial owner into the following cases: (1)
αE ∈ [max[b,m], 1] = [m, 1] (2) αE ∈ [0,m]. We first describe the beliefs on the EOS and the
corresponding value functions in each interval.
Case (1). By Lemma 1, µ = 1. Then all investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We
assume that in this interval the initial owner EOS is anticipated as long as wE satisfies condition
(31) (Lemma 9). Lemma 14 implies then that: αE = m, wE = wE,E and the initial owner’s value
function, VE,E , is given by equation (46). Otherwise when wE < wE,E we assume there is no trade
and the initial owner’s value function is equal to 1.
Case (2). This case is the same as Case (3) of Proposition 2. The initial owner’s value function is
VE,NM = max[RX̄ −K + 1, 1].
Maximizing across intervals of Cases (1) and (2) the initial owner will choose αE = m as long
as VE,E ≥ VE,NM . This occurs when m ≤ M̄E .





this is the unique equilibrium, induced by the uniqueness of the Initial
Owner EOS.
The proof of parts (C) and (D) follows directly from Proposition 2 and Corollary 1, just reversing
the condition VE,E |αE= 12 ≤ VE,n.
A.3.3 Liquidity Shareholder Equilibrium. Proof of Proposition 3: Let:
M̄L ≡ min [ML,RC ,ML,S ] (58)
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where M̄L,RC , M̄L,S are respectively the solutions in m of:
RK − γ
2
σ2X̄2m2 − εL = 0 (59)
RX̄ +K − γ
2
σ2X̄2m2 = 0 (60)
Following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 2, we break up the maximization problem





















; (4) αE ∈ [0,m). As before, we first describe the beliefs on the EOS in
each interval and the corresponding value functions.
Case (1). By Lemma 1, µ = 1. All investors anticipate monitoring in the last stage. We assume the
following beliefs about the EOS at date 1: if wE ≥ wE,L then the anticipated EOS is the Liquidity
Shareholder EOS which exists by Lemma 11. If wE < wE,L the project does not go ahead and the
initial owner gets value VE,NT . By Lemma 16, if a Liquidity Shareholder equilibrium exists the
initial owner’s value function, VE,L, is given by equation (48).
Case (2). If wE ≥ wE,n there exists an n-Blockholder EOS by Lemma 15. The value function is
given by VE,n, expression (47). If wE < wE,n then the belief on the EOS is the No Trade EOS,
with value function VE,NT .
23
Case (3). In this case the unique EOS is the Initial Owner EOS for wE ≥ wE,E . Using the proof
of Lemma 14 we know that the initial owner minimizes αE , i.e. αE = d ≡ min[α̂, 12 ] and the value
function is given by VE,E . If wE < wE,E the belief on the EOS is the No Trade EOS, with value
function VE,NT .
Case (4). As in Case (3) Proposition 2 the initial owner’s value function is given by VE,NM .
Note that VE,E |αE=d < VE,E |αE=ᾱ = VE,L as the initial owner’s value function is decreasing
in αE . Hence, the liquidity shareholder ownership structure of Case (1) is preferred over the
Initial Owner equilibrium in Case (3). Second, as in the proof of Proposition 2, VE,n|αE=α̃(n) <
VE,n|αE=m < VE,L. Hence Case (1) is preferred over Case (2). m ≤ M̄L guarantees that VE,L ≥
VE,NM .
23In this interval there can be also an Initial Owner EOS if n > 1 and wE ≥ wE . In such a case the proof that
shows that the initial owner prefers the Liquidity Shareholder EOS follows the same steps as Case (3).
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A.3.4 No Conflicts of Interest Equilibrium. Proof of Proposition 4: We now partition
into : (1) αE ∈ [max[0,m], 1] = [m, 1] (2) αE ∈ [0,m]. The proof follows the same steps as in
the proof of Proposition 2. However, now in Case (1) there are no conflicts among shareholders.
Uniqueness of the no conflicts equilibrium follows from uniqueness of the EOS.
A.4 Comparative Statics





> 0. (b) ∂α̂∂λ ≥ 0. (c)
∂VE,n





Proof The proof of parts (a) and (d) follows directly from the study of the derivative
(b) α̂(n) ≡ max[α̂1(n), α̂2(n)]. ∂α̂1(n)∂λ = −
2(n−2)
(n(1−λ)−2(1+λ))2 . This is positive if n < 2, that is
when α̂1(n) < 1/2. α̂2(n) is defined as the threshold such that if αE ≤ α̂(n) then wE,E ≤ wE,n
when X1 = X̄. This condition can be rewritten as:




Since ∂αn∂λ < 0, the above condition is less binding for higher λ and hence
∂α̂2
∂λ > 0.
(c) The sign of
∂VE,n






. This is always negative
as m (1− 2n (1− λ))− λ+m2 (1 + λ) < 0.
Lemma 18. (a) ∂ᾱ
∂X̄
< 0; (b) ∂α̂
∂X̄













∂K ≥ 0; (b)
∂VE,i
∂K < 0 with i = {NC,n,E, L}; (c)
∂wjE
∂K > 0 with j =
{NC,n,E, L};
Proof Proofs of Lemmas 18 and 19 follow from the study of the sign of the derivatives.
A.5 Robustness checks
Proof of Lemma 7: The initial owner prefers to issue dual class shares if:
VE,E |αE=m > VE,n |αE=m (62)
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Condition (15) follows.
Proof of Lemma 8: The initial owner’s value function has a maximum for n = n∗. As

















Figure 1: The Time Structure
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Figure 2: Example of Blockholder equilibrium (R = 1, γ = 12, σ = 0.2, X̄ = 50, λ = 0.1, n = 1).
LS stands for Liquidity Shareholder, BH for Blockholder and IO for Initial Owner.
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